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Carpenter: Framing Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence on a Textual Foundation 
Seth Essendrop* 
I. Introduction 
“This is a chance for you to say anything without repercussions,” Michael Scott assured his 
employees, coaxing them into revealing times when they had violated “business ethics.”1  After 
several confessions of relatively minor infractions, including Scott’s own admission of “time 
theft,” Meredith Palmer copped to a jaw-dropping violation: “I’ve been sleeping with [a vendor] 
in exchange for discounts on our supplies and Outback Steakhouse gift certificates.”2  This 
revelation led to a conflict between the human resources representative who felt duty-bound to 
report this behavior, and the manager who insisted that his promise of immunity shielded Meredith 
from consequences for her misconduct.3   
The scenario described above—a narration of an episode of the popular mockumentary, “The 
Office”—is entirely fictional, but is nevertheless an apt metaphor for the very real issue of 
determining how to apply Fourth Amendment protections in an increasingly digital world.  While 
many believe that the Amendment protects their online activities from the prying eyes of 
government, courts have struggled to determine what data merits Fourth Amendment protections 
in an ever changing, ever expanding universe of digital information. 
Ratified in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”4  As with much of the Bill of Rights, this amendment provided protection against abuses 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.E., Stevens Institute of Technology. 
1 The Office: Business Ethics (NBC television broadcast October 9, 2008). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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suffered by colonial Americans at the hands of the British.5  The specific evil this amendment 
sought to remedy was the issuance of “writs of assistance” and “general warrants” which granted 
law enforcement broad power to perform searches with minimal justification required.6  The 
Fourth Amendment enshrined the common law protection of enumerated items—persons, houses, 
papers, and effects—which protection was grounded in property law, as set forth in Entick v. 
Carrington in 1765.7  Though privacy was certainly an interest which was buttressed in the context 
of the textually articulated items aforementioned, the amendment did not guarantee a general right 
to privacy.8  And even to the extent that privacy is a protected interest in the Fourth Amendment, 
its drafters could not possibly have foreseen the advent of the digital age, or the unique challenges 
presented by the ubiquitous devices and voluminous data that characterize today’s world. 
Even before the dawn of the digital revolution, the Supreme Court recognized that the property-
based conception of the Fourth Amendment, requiring a physical trespass to trigger the warrant 
requirement, could not protect the privacy of citizens in the face of new technologies.  Hence, in 
1967, the Court ruled that absence of physical trespass alone could not obviate the need for a 
warrant.9  Instead, an action would be a search—and thus require a warrant—if it violated an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, that is, if the individual demonstrated a subjective 
expectation of privacy that society considered reasonable.10   
The advanced technology considered in Katz v. United States was a microphone enabling 
eavesdropping into a phone conversation.11  Since then, the proliferation of devices, types of data, 
 
5 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625–27 (1885). 
6 Id.  
7 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (C.P. 1765). 
8 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). 
9 Id. at 353 (stating that “the reach of [the Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical 
intrusion into any given enclosure.”). 
10 Id. at 351. 
11 Id. at 348. 
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volume and granularity of data, and the capabilities for using that data in an intrusive manner have 
added immense complexity to the questions of Fourth Amendment protections. 
The number of devices in today’s world collecting and transmitting information is staggering.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court noted in Carpenter that cell phones have become ubiquitous in the 
modern world, almost equating them to appendages of their users.12  Cell phones have the ability 
to collect and transmit information regarding location, movement, and also chronicle information 
related to application usage, use patterns, internet search history, and a plethora of other data 
points.13  So varied are the types of devices that can connect to the internet and transmit information 
that they cannot be generalized as simply phones, computers, sensors, or even smart devices, but 
are instead referred to generically as, the “Internet of Things” (IOT).14  
The diversity of potential data sources is matched by the variety of data types these sources 
analyze and disseminate.  Wireless carriers collect information relating to internet usage to enable 
billing.15  Files and pictures contain metadata (data about data) that provide information about the 
file such as who created it, when it was created, where it was created, and, in the case of a 
photograph, who is in the picture.16  Home devices may measure noise levels, temperature, motion 
patterns, and more.17  Practically all smart phones and many other technological items are GPS-
 
12 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) 
13 See, e.g., David Nleld, All the Sensors in Your Smart Phone and How They Work, GIZMODO (July 23, 2017, 11:49 
AM), https://gizmodo.com/all-the-sensors-in-your-smartphone-and-how-they-work-1797121002. 
14 Dalmacio V. Posadas, Jr., The Internet of Things: Abandoning the Third-Party Doctrine and Protecting Data 
Encryption, 53 GONZ. L. REV. 90, 91–100 (2017) 
15 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
16 See Megan Logan, The Coolest Stuff You Didn’t Know Google Photos Could Do, WIRED (June 8, 2015, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/06/coolest-stuff-didnt-know-google-photos/. 
17 See, e.g., 26 Smart Home Sensors, HOME STRATOSPHERE, https://www.homestratosphere.com/smart-home-sensors/ 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2019). 
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enabled and can track location information.  Anymore, a large portion of a person’s daily activities 
is chronicled and logged by the devices and applications with which they interact.18 
Part of the issue, however, in applying Fourth Amendment protection to such data is that the 
data is actually stored, and in many cases owned by third parties.19  Indeed, an individual may not 
even be privy to the information collected about them, much of which is used for business purposes 
by the entity collecting it.20  This data, collected, owned, and stored by third-parties—often 
unbeknownst to the subject—cannot neatly fit within the items given explicit Fourth Amendment 
protection. 
Additionally, while the raw data may be revealing enough, it is now possible to mine and 
analyze the information for the purpose of deriving powerful insights.  Information about an 
individual’s online activity is used to enhance the effectiveness of marketing to both that individual 
and the public.21  Facial recognition technology has advanced to the point where persons in 
photographs can be automatically tagged and identified.22  Banks and credit card companies are 
able to detect fraudulent activity by comparing transactions against the known patterns in a 
customer’s financial history.23  Political campaigns mine social media information to target voters 
 
18 See F.T.C., Internet of Things: Privacy and Security in a Connected World 14–15 (2015) (discussing the data-
collecting capabilities of smart devices currently on the market). 
19 See, e.g., Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (May 25, 2018), https://policies.google.com/privacy#infocollect (detailing 
various types of information Google collects on its users and how it collects this information.  While some of this 
information is stored on the client side, the policy explicitly states that some of the technologies used to store 
information are “databases and server logs”). 
20 See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (discussing the fact that CSLI is collected for business reasons “including 
finding weak spots in their network and applying ‘roaming’ charges when another carrier routes data through their 
cell sites”). 
21 Privacy Policy, supra note 19 (“We use the information we collect to customize our services for you, including 
providing recommendations, personalized content, and customized search results.”). 
22 In fact, this is the subject of litigation against Facebook citing violation of privacy rights.  See In re Facebook 
Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 326 F.R.D. 535, 540 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (detailing the process by which Facebook 
automatically identifies persons in photographs and provides tagging suggestions on the basis thereon). 
23 Jungwoo Ryoo, Machine Learning and Big Data Know It Wasn’t You Who Just Swiped Your Credit Card, GOVTECH 
(Nov. 27, 2017), http://www.govtech.com/fs/Machine-Learning-And-Big-Data-Know-It-Wasnt-You-Who-Just-
Swiped-Your-Credit-Card.html. 
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and hone their message to appeal to those voters.24  These and other evolving technologies and 
tools further encroach on the privacy of individuals, even when the data itself would not have been 
revealing without them.  
Some may indeed be alarmed by the revelation that the technologies and services they use are 
in turn being used to monitor them.  But, however uncomfortable it may seem, the collection of 
user data by private actors does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment, even though a warrant 
may be required if the same surveillance were to be performed by state actors.25  What result, then, 
when the government, without a warrant, co-opts a private party’s legitimate surveillance data 
about their clientele? 
Despite the contention of some that the Fourth Amendment should, and in fact, does provide 
protection for Americans’ digital information, courts have been hesitant to provide blanket 
protection to this data.26  In Katz, the Supreme Court announced a test, triggering the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement when a search violates an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.27  Such a privacy-based approach may seem to fortify data protection, but in reality, that 
has not been the outcome of its application in practice.28   
 
24 Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know as Fallout Widens, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 19, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.html 
(explaining how Cambridge Analytica analyzed Facebook profile information on 50 million American voters to 
provide insights enabling the influence of their votes). 
25 Even an unreasonable search conducted by a third party who then reveals the content searched to the police is not a 
Fourth Amendment violation, so long as the third party was not acting on behalf of the government.  United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113–14 (1984).  This is known as the private search doctrine, and is applied, for example in 
the context of illicit digital content that service providers may find in the accounts of their users.  See United States v. 
Reddick, 900 F.3d 636, 638–40 (5th Cir. 2018).  Companies continually scan user content, and when such illicit 
material is found, they report it to law enforcement.  Id.  Though, in effect, this is the same as 24-hour surveillance, 
the fact that it is done by third-parties shields such evidence from the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.  Id. 
26 John M. Junker, Criminal Law: The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of the Protection, 79 J CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105, 1125–26 (1989) (remarking that “Katz seems to have been to provide an additional ground 
for denying fourth amendment protection by refusing ‘legitimacy’ to assertions of privacy in [multiple contexts]”). 
27 389 U.S. 347, 352–54 (1967). 
28 Junker, supra note 2626, at 1125 (stating that “[w]hat is remarkable . . . is how little was changed by Katz's 
abandonment of the ‘trespass’ standard of Olmstead . . . .”). 
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This is due, in large part, to the development of the “third-party doctrine,” which states that 
information willingly provided to a third-party is not subject to a warrant requirement.29  A cursory 
glance at the privacy policies and terms of service of popular web sites, applications, and services 
will reveal that each is collecting data on their users, and storing this information on their 
technology infrastructure for use in a myriad of business applications.30  Thus, the third-party 
doctrine placed a large amount of digital information outside Fourth Amendment protection, 
enabling law enforcement to procure through subpoenas the data to which the doctrine applies. 
In Carpenter v. United States, however, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement is 
required to obtain a warrant before obtaining multiple days of cell-site location information 
(“CSLI”) from a suspect’s cellular service provider.31  The holding of the case was limited to the 
factual circumstances at issue; the Court did not announce a rule, and did not clarify with precision 
where the government crossed the threshold triggering Fourth Amendment protections, only that 
law enforcement acted unconstitutionally.32  But, the mere fact that the third-party doctrine did not 
control in this case is significant, and will lead lower courts to divine factors from the Carpenter 
decision which would mandate a warrant for searches which would otherwise be considered 
reasonable.33 
In this Comment, I will suggest a rationale for the Carpenter decision which would both bind 
it explicitly to the text of the Fourth Amendment and simplify the application of the Carpenter 
ruling to other cases.  Additionally, while acknowledging that some digital content falls within the 
 
29 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–43 (1976); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979). 
30 E.g., Privacy and Cookie Policy, DUNKIN DONUTS, https://www.dunkindonuts.com/en/privacy-policy#whatcollect 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2018).  Even a simple application such as the Dunkin Donuts “DDPerks” application collects a 
myriad of data on users including service use data, device connectivity data, location information, and more. 
31 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). 
32 Id. 
33 Id.  The same analysis may apply to other types of data presenting the same concerns, but now the bar will be 
lowered, as never before has the Court excepted such data from the third-party doctrine. 
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purview of the Fourth Amendment, I will caution against the expansion of its protections with no 
textual justification.  
Accordingly, Part II will provide a history of the Fourth Amendment, and the pre-Katz property 
principles governing the determination of whether an activity constitutes a search.  Part III will 
analyze Katz and its progeny and explore the outcomes of a privacy-based approach to the Fourth 
Amendment.  Part IV will outline how a property-based approach has been applied in cases 
involving technological advancements post-Katz.  Part V will discuss Carpenter, its holding, the 
rationale, and questions that will need to be answered in its wake.  Part VI will argue for the 
abandonment of the Katz test when evaluating potential Fourth Amendment concerns with new 
technology.  Part VII will introduce a potential property-oriented rationale for the holding in 
Carpenter, and the application of such a principle in future cases.  Part VIII will argue for the role 
of the legislature in protecting the privacy of citizens in the absence of a clear Fourth Amendment 
proscription of a search and seizure. 
II. Origins and Early Application of the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment was not a safeguard against theoretical abuse of government power, 
but a response to actual wrongdoing on the part of the British government.  In Brower v. County 
of Inyo, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “writs of assistance [were] the principal grievance 
against which the Fourth Amendment was directed . . . .”34 
These writs, which were a sub-species of general warrants, were instruments used in the 
American colonies to enable law enforcement to perform wide-ranging searches of “ships, 
warehouses, and homes, and all persons, papers, and effects contained therein . . . .”35  Most often, 
 
34 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989). 
35 Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1244 (2016). 
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they were used to deter smuggling, the evasion of customs, and other trade and tax-related 
offenses.36  Not only were these writs broad in terms of authority granted and items which could 
be searched, they also possessed an onerous temporal property.  Once granted, these authorizations 
did not expire until the death of the sovereign under whose authority they were issued.37  Thus, if 
a writ was issued against a citizen, the officers executing that writ would have carte blanche to 
search the subject’s person, home, and place of business until the passing of the monarch. 
The occasion of King George II’s death and the impending expiration of writs of assistance 
issued during his reign provided the American colonists an opportunity to challenge the 
government’s attempt to renew them.38  In the ensuing action, “Paxton’s Case”, James Otis Jr. 
issued a forceful denunciation of the tyranny and excesses of general warrants and writs of 
assistance, asserting that their use would annihilate the freedom of “one’s house.”39  Though Otis 
ultimately lost that case, the ensuing outrage proved an accelerant for the growing discontent with 
British rule, and John Adams, who was present at the proceedings, remarked that “[t]hen and there 
the child Independence was born.”40  Indeed, after the War of Independence, when the states were 
considering ratification of the proposed Constitution, some decried the document’s silence as to 
general warrants, an omission they termed one of the “curses” of the new Constitution.41 
The historical record certainly demonstrates colonial Americans’ antipathy towards general 
warrants, but this was not unique to America, nor was the rationale an outgrowth of a distinctly 
American approach to law.  The colonies were governed by English law, and the Americans 
inherited conceptions of freedom and rights from Great Britain.  Even in “Paxton’s Case” the 
 
36 Id. at 1242–49 
37 Tracy Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U.L. REV. 925, 946 (1997). 
38 Donohue, supra note 35, at 1248. 
39 Maclin, supra note 3737, at 946. 
40 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886). 
41 Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 587 n.98 (1999). 
 
 
9 
 
colonials invoked “English liberties,” and their case rested on the well-known maxim in English 
law that “a man’s house is his castle.”42 
English common law did indeed provide rigid protection against invasion into a man’s home.  
In fact, the seminal case on the topic, Entick v. Carington, was decided in 1765, and involved 
exactly the type of general warrant against which Otis argued in Paxton’s Case.43  Entick involved 
a general warrant issued for the search of libelous writings in the homes of individuals associated 
and allied with John Wilkes, a politician in England.44  Though libel did not occur until publication, 
and the possession of libelous materials itself was not a crime, officers were directed to “make a 
diligent search” of Mr. Entick’s home, and the homes of his confederates, to find these types of 
materials.45 
Mr. Entick brought a trespass action against the officials who had searched his home and the 
Secretary of State that issued the warrants.46  The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that 
the warrants in question were illegal, and thus, any search thereby authorized was a trespass.47  
In Entick, the court rested its determination on the sanctity of an individual’s property, and the 
strong protection afforded to such property by law against even government intrusion.  “The great 
end for which men entered society was to secure their property,” the court declared, adding that 
“every invasion of private property . . . is a trespass.  No man can set his foot upon my ground 
without my license, but he is liable to an action, though the damage be nothing . . . [the] defendant 
is called to answer for bruising the grass and even treading on the soil.”48 
 
42 Donohue, supra note 35, at 1251. 
43 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 808 (C.P. 1765). 
44 Id. at 807–08. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 818. 
48 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886) (quoting Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 818). 
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Notably, however, in protecting the papers of the plaintiff, the court held that the “eye cannot 
by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass . . . .”49  Simply viewing an individual’s papers did 
not itself require a warrant, however, this invasion of privacy would serve to aggravate a trespass 
and increase damages where the papers were obtained without a valid warrant authorized by a 
magistrate.50 
So famous and studied was this case that in Boyd the Court noted that “every American 
statesmen, during our revolutionary and formative period . . . was undoubtedly familiar with 
[Entick]” and its propositions provided the explanation for what constituted a search and seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment.51  Though Entick is an English case from 1765, it has been cited in 
multiple Supreme Court decisions regarding the protections of the Fourth Amendment.52  As 
recently as 2012, the Court has reaffirmed that Entick remains “‘the true and ultimate expression 
of constitutional law’ with regard to search and seizure.”53 
Accordingly, early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence did not require a warrant for law 
enforcement to perform searches that would not otherwise constitute a trespass.  Thus, for example, 
in Olmstead v. United States, warrantless wire-tapping was deemed constitutional because in 
tapping phone lines, the government did not physically intrude onto an individual’s person, house, 
papers, or effects.54  Though some of the phones on which the government had set up monitoring 
were within individual homes, the Court did not look to the privacy of the individuals under 
surveillance, because no trespass had occurred to facilitate it.55 
 
49 Id. at 627–28. 
50 Id. at 628. 
51 Id. at 626–27. 
52 See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012); Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001); United States v. U.S. D., 407 U.S. 297, 327; Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627. 
53 Jones, 565 U.S. at 405. 
54 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
55 Id. 
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Justice Brandeis objected to this formalistic and text-based approach in his dissent.56  The 
Constitution, he asserted, was designed to be applied flexibly to situations which the drafters could 
not have imagined.57  He looked beyond the “mischief which gave [the Fourth Amendment] birth” 
to the principle underlying the amendment’s proscriptions.58  In his view, the Fourth Amendment 
protected individuals from “all invasions on the part of the Government . . . of the sanctities of a 
man’s home, and the privacies of life.”59 
Though Brandeis was a dissenter in Olmstead, his privacy-centered approach ultimately won 
vindication almost forty year later when the Supreme Court decided Katz.60 
III. Katz and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
“We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead . . . have been so eroded . . . that the 
‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.”61  With these words, 
the Supreme Court in Katz untethered the definition of a “search” from the text of the Fourth 
Amendment, and replaced the formalism that had hitherto characterized their approach with a new, 
privacy-centered test.62 
The issue in that case was whether law enforcement’s use of a listening device in a telephone 
booth for the purpose of eavesdropping on Mr. Katz violated his Fourth Amendment rights.63  The 
government was attempting to find evidence that he was violating federal law by transmitting 
wagering information across state lines through the use of a telephone.64  Though the government 
 
56 Id. at 472–74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 474. 
60 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) 
61 Id. 
62 Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 247–
50 (1993) (examining the Katz shift from the traditional property-based principles through the lens of pragmatism). 
63 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
64 Id. 
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argued that a telephone booth was not a protected area, as set forth in the text of the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court declined to base its decision on the merits of that particular argument.65  
Instead, the Court focused on Mr. Katz’s expectation of privacy, declaring that the “Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.”66  In overruling Olmstead and the trespass requirement, 
the Court lambasted the formalism of the prior approach, and held that Fourth Amendment 
protection “cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given 
enclosure.”67 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence best articulates the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, 
which replaced the trespass requirement as the judicial inquiry to determine if a search had 
occurred.68  Under this new rule, a warrant would be required for investigative activities that 
violate an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.69  This determination hinges on two 
enquiries: (1) whether a person has shown an actual expectation of privacy in their activity and (2) 
whether society would recognize that expectation as reasonable.70  
A. The Subjective Expectation of Privacy 
In order to demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy a person must have an intent to 
keep something private.71  In some cases, the Court has identified specific behavior of an individual 
directed towards maintaining privacy.  For example, though the majority opinion in Katz did not 
 
65 Id. at 351 (stating that the question of whether the phone booth is a constitutionally protected area is “misleading” 
and “deflects attention from the [real] problem presented in [the] case.”). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 353. 
68 Cloud, supra note 62, at 249 (stating that the formula used in the opinion is an “amorphous standard” and was 
therefore replaced with the test used in Justice Harlan’s concurrence). 
69 Id. 
70 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
71 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351). 
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address this prong, Justice Harlan identifies Mr. Katz’s payment of a toll to use the phone, and his 
having closed the door behind him as manifestations of his intent to preserve his privacy.72 
Often however, this intent must be inferred from the circumstances.  When a person does 
something in plain view, he cannot claim an intent to keep private what anyone could easily 
observe.73  A warrant is not required to monitor a car on the highway, for example, and the Court 
has held that when travelling in public roads the car and its contents are “in plain view” and thus, 
the operator has not shown an intent to preserve privacy.74  
Revealing information to another undermines a subjective expectation of privacy, even when 
the audience to which the revelation is made is limited, and even where the information disclosed 
is confidential.75  According to the Court, when a person knows or should know what he conveys 
to a third party will be somehow used by that party, he has no subjective intent to maintain the 
privacy of that information.76  Thus, when a person dials a phone number, he cannot expect the 
number they dialed to be private, as that data point is used by the phone service providers to route 
the call, and for other business purposes.77 
Additionally, though the Court acknowledges that subjective expectations of privacy are 
difficult to ascertain, historical determinations of what constituted a search and seizure when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted should inform the analysis.78  Therefore, for example, even when 
an individual does not specifically manifest an expectation of privacy, the very fact of being in 
 
72 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
73 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983). 
74 Id. at 285. 
75 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that Mr. Miller did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in bank records, despite the fact that he thought these were private).  
76 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (discussing the fact that telephone companies use the information around what phone 
numbers a subscriber dials for business purposes, among which are billing.  Subscribers know or should know that 
telephone companies have the ability to record this information partly because it is the basis on which they are billed). 
77 Id. 
78 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018). 
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one’s home merits a strong presumption that such an expectation applies, because the home has 
always been afforded strong protections.79 
B. Whether Society Is Prepared to Accept an Expectation of Privacy as Reasonable. 
The simple fact that a person desires to keep something private does not, by itself, impose a 
warrant requirement upon law enforcement before a search may be conducted; that expectation 
must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.80  The Court in Katz illustrated 
this by distinguishing the aspects of Mr. Katz’s conduct that merited Fourth Amendment 
protection, and which did not.81  In response to the government’s contention that Katz was in plain 
view, and thus was not eligible for protection, the Court stated that phone booths are not meant to 
shield their occupants from view (notwithstanding the fact that the Man of Steel often resorted to 
such a booth to protect his identity while changing clothes).82  They are, however, designed to 
maintain the privacy of the user’s conversation.83  Thus, applying Justice Harlan’s reasoning, 
society is prepared to accept as reasonable a phone booth user’s expectation of privacy.  Insofar as 
reasonability is dependent on the views of society, this prong of the test is necessarily a normative 
determination.84  Conceivably, then, as cultural mores and feelings on the topic change, so too do 
the boundaries of what would be protected. 
Katz’s departure from the trespass requirement may seem, at first glance, to expand privacy 
rights.  In reality, however, courts have historically applied a conservative approach in its 
application, and have not, for the most part, wielded Katz to craft broader privacy protections.85  
 
79 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
80 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986) (holding that, despite clear intent on the part of Mr. Ciraolo to 
shield his home from view, society is “not prepared to honor” such an expectation as against aerial surveillance). 
81 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 See Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 643, 657 (2013). 
85 Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 801, 809–11 (2004). 
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Generally, the Supreme Court has declined to find that society is prepared to recognize a privacy 
expectation as reasonable where an individual has taken the risk of exposing information either to 
a limited audience or the public at large.86 
Thus, for example, in California v. Ciraolo the Court held that aerial surveillance does not run 
afoul of societal expectations of privacy.87  It does not matter that an individual is in a remote 
location, or even on their own property or within the “curtilage” of their own home.88  They have 
assumed the risk of exposing their location, and whatever outdoor activities they are doing; 
consequently, observing those activities is not a search.89  Privacy rights, then, may just as easily 
be contracted under Katz as expanded, depending on the given court’s view of society’s 
expectations.  
This holding on aerial surveillance also highlights another chink in Katz’s privacy-protecting 
armor.  Namely that, when applying a Katz analysis of the reasonable expectation of privacy, the 
Court has repeatedly ruled that individuals are not necessarily shielded from increased surveillance 
capabilities available to today’s law enforcement.90  Modern technology allows law enforcement 
capabilities that are magnitudes greater than their colonial counterparts would have had.  
Nevertheless, increased efficiency in obtaining information and surveillance does not trigger 
Fourth Amendment protection.91  While acknowledging that extended periods of surveillance may 
raise constitutional issues, the Court found no Fourth Amendment violation in a situation where 
police used a beeper to track a vehicle’s movements.92  That is not to suggest, however, that all 
 
86 Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a 
Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002). 
87 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. (stating that 24-hour surveillance drag-net style law enforcement practices may necessitate the application of 
different constitutional principles). 
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forms of surveillance may be employed without the necessity of first obtaining a warrant.  The 
demarcation between permissible and constitutionally problematic monitoring hinges on the type 
of information the surveillance reveals.93  If the information obtained through surveillance “could 
not otherwise have been procured without physical ‘intrusion into the constitutionally protected 
area’” the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant.94 
The third-party doctrine is another way in which society’s determination of reasonableness 
abridges rather than enhances privacy.  This doctrine states that, absent legislation to the contrary, 
“when a person communicates information to a third party even on the understanding that the 
communication is confidential, he cannot object if the third party conveys that information . . . to 
law enforcement . . . .”95  The rule first arose in the context of physical documents used in financial 
transactions.96  In United States v. Miller, the Court ruled that a subpoena was sufficient 
authorization for obtaining bank records, regardless of Mr. Miller’s expectation that his 
correspondence with his bank should remain private.97  The holding of Smith v. Maryland extended 
this reasoning to a more technologically advanced fact-set, holding that the doctrine applied to the 
phone numbers a person dials.98  An individual, by necessity, shares a phone number with a cellular 
provider when making a call, and that information is used to route the call to the correct party.99  
That information, being shared, loses Fourth Amendment protections.  Notably, however, the 
contents of the call itself, the conversation, may not be subpoenaed from a provider, because the 
call itself was not shared with them.100  Because the majority of data generated by and about 
 
93 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
94 Id. 
95 SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 743 (1984). 
96 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
97 Id. 
98 442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979). 
99 Id. at 744. 
100 Id. at 741 (distinguishing the device from that in Katz on the basis of the fact that a pen register does not facilitate 
listening to or recording calls, and thus the outcome would not be the same as that in Katz). 
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individuals today is stored by a third party, and because that data is not even generated by the user 
and thus is not content, the third party doctrine places a vast swath of data outside Fourth 
Amendment protection. 
In fact, the application of Katz has been so tepid, some have argued that outcomes of cases 
analyzed under the Katz framework has not been appreciably different than would have been so 
under the common law.101  Professor Orin Kerr even goes so far as to describe Katz as a “more of 
a revolution on paper than in practice.”102  Indeed, he contends that the Court could have reached 
the same result in the case had it applied Fourth Amendment trespass doctrine, and that the Court’s 
explicit repudiation of this approach was therefore unnecessary.103  This argument relies on the 
fact that a phone booth could arguably be considered a “house” for purposes of a Fourth 
Amendment search determination, providing a tie-in to the literal text of the amendment.104 
 While the reasonable expectation test looks past the text of the Fourth Amendment to the 
underlying principles, not text, courts have generally applied it conservatively.  Due to the high 
degree of subjectivity inherent in assessments of both individual expectations of privacy and 
society’s tolerance for those expectations, judges have broad discretion when defining these in the 
context of Fourth Amendment search determinations.  Generally, even when an individual may 
harbor expansive expectations of privacy, the protections for this privacy are reined in by the 
second prong of the test.105  Despite the concern expressed by Justice White in his dissent from the 
 
101 Kerr, supra note 85, at 824 (stating that the “Fourth Amendment today remains surprisingly similar to the Fourth 
Amendment before Katz”). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 822 (postulating that the outcome of Katz was “correctly decided from the standpoint of [a] loose property-
based approach”). 
104 Id. at 809–11.  See infra text accompanying note 134. 
105 There are several doctrines which limit Fourth Amendment protections, even where an individual desires to keep 
something private.  Under the third-party doctrine, a person’s communications with another are not protected by the 
Fourth Amendment, regardless of his intent.  See supra text accompanying note 95.  The private search doctrine 
disregards individual expectations of privacy where another party has already invaded that privacy.  See supra note 
25; see generally United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).  Additionally, the open fields doctrine provides that 
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Katz decision, its application has not produced a radical departure from the text of the Fourth 
Amendment.106 
IV. Trespass and Technological Advancement 
Trespass theory, though wounded in Katz, did not die.  Despite suffering a major setback with 
Olmstead’s reversal, some aspects survived, and some were folded into the reasonable expectation 
of privacy test.  While Katz overturned Olmstead, holding that a trespass is not a prerequisite to a 
Fourth Amendment search, a physical trespass on a constitutionally protected area remains a 
search requiring a warrant.107  The reasonable expectation of privacy test then did not replace 
trespass theory, but merely supplemented it.  Therefore, where a trespass does occur on property 
enumerated in the text of the Fourth Amendment, the Court need not reach the question of whether 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and can instead proceed directly with common law 
trespass doctrine.108 
Accordingly, there is a line of cases in which the occurrence of a Fourth Amendment search 
or seizure turns on the trespass doctrine without the need to resort to the Katz reasonableness 
enquiry.  Significantly, the Court has declined to abridge property rights, specifically in the home 
when the Katz test might justify greater intrusion on the part of the government.109  If an action 
 
“an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area 
immediately surrounding the home.”  Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (finding that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in activities performed outside, even where the subject of surveillance has clearly 
expressed a intent to keep these activities private through the posting of “no trespass” signs). 
106 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373 (1967) (White, J., dissenting). 
107 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012). 
108 Id. 
109 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37–38 (2001) (reiterating the high degree of protection afforded the home, and 
that even the slightest details revealed about a home are intimate simply because they relate to it). 
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would have been an unreasonable search or seizure under the old trespass doctrine, it would still 
require a warrant; Katz, then, supplements trespass doctrine rather than supplanting it entirely.110 
In United States v. Knotts, the Court ruled that a beeper in a barrel which transmitted a 
defendant’s location to government authorities did not violate the Fourth Amendment.111  While 
this case ultimately turned on a Katz expectation of privacy analysis, the Court notes that the 
defendant did not challenge the warrantless installation of the tracking device within the barrel that 
defendant bought, then transported to his cabin.112  The defendant did not challenge on the basis 
of trespass on his car, due to the fact that he had placed the barrel within his car.113  This distinction 
became relevant in United States v. Jones, which did, in fact, turn on the occurrence of a trespass 
on the car.114 
In Jones, officers attached a tracking device to the undercarriage of the defendant’s car.115  The 
court held that a car constitutes an “effect” for Fourth Amendment purposes, and so, physically 
installing a tracking device thereon is a search.116  The Court stated in simple terms that the 
“[g]overnment physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”117  
Because this trespass would have been considered a search at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s 
adoption, it was considered a search, and there was no need to weigh the privacy considerations 
implicated.118 
 
110 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (“The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what 
was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public 
interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.”). 
111 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983). 
112 Id. at 280. 
113 Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
114 565 U.S. 400, 404–13 (2012). 
115 Id. at 403. 
116 Id. at 404. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
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As technology has advanced, the Court has continued to protect the guarantee of privacy within 
one’s house, which remains the “prototypical . . . area of protected privacy.”119  New innovations 
enable sophisticated surveillance without the need for a physical trespass, and it is possible that 
these developments could condition society to accept a reduction in privacy expectations in 
response to these capabilities.120  When faced with this challenge, the court looks to the degree of 
privacy guaranteed at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s adoption.121  Put simply, if technology 
enables the acquisition of information that would not otherwise have been obtainable without a 
physical trespass on a constitutionally protected space, it is a search, and its use requires a 
warrant.122 
Even under the subjective test of Katz, the Court remains zealously protective of the home.  
Before Katz, the mere act of cracking a door open and peeking inside was considered a search and 
invading a structure by so much as a portion of an inch was a trespass and required a warrant.123  
As previously stated, the mere existence of a tracking device on a vehicle does not constitute 
a search if law enforcement did not physically place the instrument on the vehicle.124  But, where 
such a device transmits information from within or at a defendant’s “house,” Fourth Amendment 
protections are activated.125  It is true that any insights from a GPS transmitter on a car would be 
evident to police who physically monitored the car: an officer could certainly follow the car until 
 
119 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
120 See, e.g., id. at 37–38 (holding that thermal scanning, allowing police officers to view heat patterns emitted from 
the home is a search); See also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986) (holding that there is no expectation 
of privacy against aerial surveillance because anyone may now fly over one’s house). 
121 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35. 
122 Id. 
123 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961). 
124 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (tracking device within a barrel loaded into a vehicle did not 
constitute a search); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012) (physical placement of a tracking device 
on a vehicle constituted a search because a trespass had occurred). 
125 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284–85 (discussing the fact that no beeper information had been transmitted or relied upon 
from within the home in dismissing the claim of privacy invasion on that basis).  
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it parked at a house and wait until the car left again to continue pursuit.126  Thus, it is not necessarily 
the nature of the information, but the mere fact that the information was collected within a 
constitutionally protected space that impedes its use. 
While, in Knotts, the Court found that no search occurred where a tracking device was within 
a vehicle which was parked near, but not inside a home, they did provide some insight into what 
might constitute relevant factors in reaching a different result.127  Specifically, the Court noted that 
future cases may raise issues of otherwise lawful surveillance techniques becoming unlawful when 
used to track individuals moving between private and public spheres.128  Such monitoring may 
“push fortuitously and unreasonably into the private sphere protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.”129  But, the Court determined that as the barrel containing the beeper remained 
outside the house, nothing was revealed that would not have been visible to the naked eye should 
the police have relied on manual surveillance.130 
An individual’s residence is certainly afforded strong protections against government 
intrusion; however, it is important to note that the “house” referenced in the Fourth Amendment 
is not limited in its interpretation solely to a person’s primary residence.131  Central to the enquiry 
of whether a space is deemed a “house”—or, in today’s legal parlance, whether an individual has 
the same reasonable expectation of privacy as he would in his home—is whether an individual 
possesses the right to exclude others from the space.132  Renters, hotel room occupants, and even 
 
126 See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (holding that no search had occurred when officers observed 
illegal activity on private property because “the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people 
in their ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ is not extended to the open fields.”).  This doctrine was applied in Knotts 
where the Court held that the respondent did not have an expectation of privacy by simply arriving on his premises 
for actions which were visible to officers.  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.  
127 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284–85. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 285. 
131 Kerr, supra note 85, at 809–11 (2004). 
132 Id. 
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guests where there is evidence their host devolved on them the right to exclude other from the 
space, would then qualify for Fourth Amendment protections in the respective spaces they occupy, 
albeit temporarily.133  Professor Kerr even goes so far in his article as to suggest that by paying the 
toll in the phone booth and shutting the door, Mr. Katz thereby transformed it into a “house” for 
Fourth Amendment purposes, and this could provide a manner to reconcile the holding in Katz 
with the text of the Fourth Amendment.134  This larger point may prove useful in rationalizing the 
Court’s evident discomfort with long periods of retroactive surveillance, as such surveillance 
necessarily includes a “house” or multiple “houses” within its sweep. 
Technology may not constitutionally allow invasion of a home’s privacy which would 
otherwise require physical intrusion, but the mere fact that an activity was performed from within 
a house does not thereby provide absolute Fourth Amendment protections against warrantless 
surveillance.135  Thus, in Smith, the defendant could not assert Fourth Amendment protection over 
the government’s acquisition of pen register information, even though he physically dialed the 
phone numbers from within his house.136  Phone conversations certainly were not possible at the 
time of the Fourth Amendment’s adoption.  To achieve such a communication, an individual would 
at least be compelled to open his window and conduct a conversation with a party outside his 
home.  This conversation obviously would not be private, and one who observed such a 
conversation could not be said to have conducted a search.137 
 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 822. 
135 See, e.g., California v. Cirialo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (stating that, even for constitutionally protected areas, 
there is no search where a police officer “observ[es] from a public vantage point where he has a right to be, and which 
renders the activities clearly visible[]”); see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–51 (1989) (holding that there is 
no search where an officer is able with the naked eye to view activity within an edifice, even where that edifice is in 
the curtilage of a house). 
136 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979). 
137 Cf. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284–85 (1983) (beeper did not reveal anything about the defendant’s 
home that was not visible to the naked eye, and thus, did not violate the privacy of the home.  This logic would apply 
to sounds from within the home as well).  
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The Fourth Amendment includes the house within its list of constitutionally protected areas.138  
In spite of Katz’s proclamation that this amendment protects “people not places,” the home remains 
a constitutionally protected place, and government trespass thereon, by itself, is a violation of 
Fourth Amendment protections.  This trespass need not be physical; modes of surveillance may be 
deemed a search if they achieve an affect that would have required a trespass had it been attempted 
without the enabling technology.139  Finally, this protection is not immune from the caveat of the 
third-party doctrine: the government may, without a warrant, obtain information from a third party, 
regardless of whether that data originated from within the monitored individual’s home.140 
V. The Carpenter Decision 
Carpenter provided an opportunity to consider the “dragnet-type law enforcement practices” 
and “twenty-four hour surveillance of . . . citizen[s]” to which the Court in Knotts acknowledged 
“different constitutional principles may be applicable.”141  Where Knotts involved a beeper, 
allowing law enforcement to track location, Carpenter deals with the subpoena of a form of 
historical location information, cell-site location information (“CSLI”).142  CSLI is a collection of 
timestamped records collected by cell service providers when a phone connects to a cell site, which 
in effect reveals the location of the cell phone at the time.143  This information is used by cell phone 
companies for multiple business purposes, including determination of fee structures (for example 
when a user is “roaming”) but also to drive business decisions around where to increase 
 
138 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (providing in relevant part that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” is protected through the warrant requirement). 
139 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
140 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–44. 
141 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283–84. 
142 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018). 
143 Kyle Malone, The Fourth Amendment and the Stored Communications Act: Why the Warrantless Gathering of 
Historical Cell Site Location Information Poses No Threat to Privacy, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 701, 708 (2012). 
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coverage.144  Because phones are constantly communicating with the network, whether the user is 
actively performing an action or not, and because in many areas, the towers gathering this 
information are closer and closer together, this information provides increasingly granular and 
accurate information about a cell phone user’s movement that sometimes proves useful to law 
enforcement in investigations.145   
The specific evidence at issue in Carpenter was 127 days’ worth of CSLI data, composed of 
12,898 discrete location records.146  The Court declined to extend the third-party doctrine to this 
evidence, finding that a search had occurred.147  In reaching this conclusion, it cited the accuracy, 
encyclopedic nature, and effortless collection of this type of data, and held that it is reasonable for 
an individual to expect privacy in his physical movements from records so collected.148  Notably, 
however, this is not a categorical proscription on the use of CSLI.  The Court stated explicitly that 
the decision is not binding for factual circumstances not before the Court.149  In spite of the focus 
on the type of data at issue, CSLI, the Court explicitly excepted “real-time CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ 
(a download of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a 
particular interval)” from the holding.150  Importantly, this case does not hold that people may have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location or their movements, but in the “whole of their 
physical movements.”151  The difference between the two is one of degree, and nothing in the 
 
144 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
145 Malone, supra note 143, at 708–09 (stating that a phone transmits CSLI approximately once every seven seconds, 
and that CSLI may be able to determine a phone’s location to within 200 feet).  
146 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
147 Id. at 2217. 
148 Id. at 2216. 
149 Id. at 2220. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 2217. 
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opinion suggests that the Court now takes an unfavorable view towards location monitoring for 
shorter temporal periods.152 
The departure from the third-party doctrine prompts two important inquiries: (1) why the 
doctrine does not apply to acquisition of long periods of CSLI information from a third-party 
provider and (2) what questions this raises for future cases involving similar types of records. 
A. Why the Third-Party Doctrine Did Not Apply in Carpenter 
There are two principle reasons the Court cites in support of its decision to distinguish CSLI 
from other data types previously considered, and hence, not to apply the third-party doctrine in 
Carpenter.  First, because CSLI differs from the surveillance methods and data in prior cases as it 
constitutes a far more exhaustive record of a person’s life, potentially exposing a wide panoply of 
otherwise private information.153  Second, because CSLI—collected by “dint of operation” of the 
phone—is not affirmatively “shared” with the third-party, and therefore, individuals do not lose 
their expectation of privacy in this information.154  
i. Difference Between CSLI and Traditional Records Subject to the Third-Party Doctrine 
 There are many ways in which the evidence at issue in Carpenter was broad and revealing.  
In a previous case, the Court, in dicta, stated that long-term surveillance may present different 
Fourth Amendment questions than 24-hour monitoring, or tracking a vehicle for discrete trips.155  
Here, the police obtained 127 days of location information, revealing all the movements of the 
target in such detail that would not have been practical, and perhaps not even possible by physical 
following at the time the Fourth Amendment was written.156 
 
152 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
153 Id. at 2217. 
154 Id. at 2220. 
155 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983). 
156 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–19. 
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 The sheer volume of records proves even more troubling because it allows a state actor to 
meticulously catalogue an individuals’ life, and derive insights into their behavior.157  Data of the 
type to which the third-party doctrine traditionally applied was relatively discrete.158  From bank 
records, police could, perhaps, deduce spending habits or glean other financial records; similarly, 
phone call records reveal details about discrete calls.159  Location information, however, when 
aggregated over a long period of time, reveals much more than simply where the person was, it 
can divulge, among other things, a person’s “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.”160  As cellular providers increase their coverage and add cell towers, this information 
becomes even more precise and the location may be ascertained to a more granular unit of 
measurement.161 
 Perhaps as troubling is the fact that the information about any given suspect’s location is 
already assembled and requires practically no effort from law enforcement to acquire.  Previously, 
determining an individual’s whereabouts at a given point in the past would have required finding 
a witness or some discrete evidence placing the suspect at a given time at a given place.  No single 
 
157 See Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework for Analyzing 
Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527, 561 (2017) (“Prolonged surveillance reveals types of 
information not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and 
what he does ensemble.”).  The aggregation of location information may also be overlaid with other data sets to 
produce even more insights.  See generally Yan Huang et al., Mining Co-Location Patterns with Rare Events from 
Spatial Data Sets, 10 GEOINFORMATICA 239 (2006). 
158 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (dealing with microfilm copies of checks and deposit 
slips); see also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (holding that conversations with an individual could 
be recorded and conveyed to police with no warrant required); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979) 
(upholding the use of a pen register, which simply recorded a list of the phone numbers an individual dialed). 
159 Prior cases dealt with limited data sets about specific activities.  See supra note 159.  Modern data mining, data 
analytics, and artificial intelligence capabilities, however, require massive data sets in order to derive insights.  See, 
e.g., Nick Ismail, The success of Artificial Intelligence Depends on Data, INFORMATION AGE (Apr. 23, 2018) 
https://www.information-age.com/success-artificial-intelligence-data-123471607/ (stating that “AI works best when 
large amounts of rich, big data are available”). 
160 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
161 See David Oscar Markus & Nathan Freed Wessler, That ‘70s Show: Why the 11th Circuit was Wrong to Rely on 
Cases from the 1970s to Decide a Cell-Phone Tracking Case, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1179, 1183–84 (2016). 
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witness could testify to everywhere an individual had ever been.162  Thus, while at any given time, 
a person may be conveying his location to “anyone who wanted to look,” the same cannot be said 
of all his movements, taken together. 
 The outstanding question, then, is how much information is too much?  At what point, or 
for what interval of time are constitutional protections trigged?  Though Carpenter is limited to 
CSLI, the answer to that question would apply in any context involving the tracking of a person’s 
location, including, as the Court acknowledged, the use of beepers and GPS trackers on vehicles.163 
ii. Absence of Voluntary Exposure of Information Shared 
One justification for the third-party doctrine is that a person assumes a risk, in revealing 
information to another, that the other will reveal it to a state actor.164  Part of the reason the Court 
in Carpenter declined to apply the third-party doctrine to the data at issue was due to the 
involuntary nature of the conveyance.165  The indispensable nature of the phone and the method in 
which the phone transmits CSLI are the factors that led the Court to this outcome.166 
Ninety-five percent of adults in America own a cell phone, and seventy-five percent own a 
“smart phone.”167  The cell phone is ubiquitous, not only in terms of ownership, but also of location 
relative to its owner.  Increasingly, these devices accompany the user everywhere they go, so much 
so that the Court characterizes it as “almost a ‘feature of human anatomy . . . .’”168 
 
162 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (observing that “Sprint Corporation and its competitors are not your typical witnesses.  
Unlike the nosy neighbor who keeps an eye on comings and goings, they are ever alert, and their memory is nearly 
infallible.”). 
163 Id. at 2215.  This assertion is made on the basis of the fact that the Court cites to the dicta in Knotts and concurring 
opinions in Jones to establish that continual surveillance would present a unique constitutional question, distinct from 
the constitutionality of the type of data in use.  Id. 
164 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (denying Fourth Amendment protection to records on the 
grounds that an individual “takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by 
that person to the Government”). 
165 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
166 Id. at 2210. 
167 Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/. 
168 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
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Additionally, as the phone is carried everywhere, it is transmitting CSLI information on a 
regular basis, whether in use or not.169  If it is both turned on and connected to the network, this 
information continues to flow to the wireless provider.170  This is not a feature that the user may 
enable, opt out of, or even see; it is collected for the wireless provider’s use by dint of the phone’s 
operation.171 
There are, however, methods by which a phone’s owner may avoid such continual monitoring, 
should he so desire.  He could turn off his phone, he could disconnect it from the network, or he 
could always decline to possess it on his person, at least for the period he does not want to be 
tracked.  Though the Court acknowledges these possibilities, it finds the compulsive use of cell 
phones in today’s modern world renders the act of always carrying a connected and powered-on 
phone involuntary.172 
B. Issues Likely to Arise from Carpenter 
The Carpenter decision has impacts beyond the explicit limits to the third-party doctrine as 
well.  In limiting the third-party doctrine as it does in Carpenter, the Court creates a Fourth 
Amendment right of an individual in the business records of another.173  Though an individual may 
have no knowledge of their CSLI being generated, and no involvement in creating the records, 
they nevertheless have a right to assert warrant protection for those records by virtue of the fact 
that they are “about” them.174 
 
169 Malone, supra note 14343, at 708. 
170 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 CSLI is generated without the input of the user and is only ever recorded by a third party.  Id. 
174 Id.  
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Additionally, though the Court recognizes the unique nature of location data in protecting the 
privacies of life,175 this decision creates much uncertainty about the Fourth Amendment 
protections of other data generated through IOT and smart devices, for example, which reveal 
certain insights about users through the dint of their operation.  Now that the Court has found a 
category of data to which the third-party doctrine does not apply, lower courts will be challenged 
to classify the numerous other species of data generated by devices on a constant basis.176  Whereas 
the third-party doctrine provided a relatively simple answer to the Katz enquiry for data, this 
decision opens the door for challenges to the warrantless acquisition of numerous other forms of 
digital information. 
Though the surveillance in Carpenter was not performed by law enforcement, but by a private 
actor, the Court nevertheless treated the acquisition of this data as a search, as if the police had 
conducted the surveillance themselves.177  This distinguishes this case from many of the prior 
Fourth Amendment cases addressing surveillance, and raises questions around when private 
actions can be attributable to the government in a way that requires a warrant.  For example, 
hitherto, under the private search doctrine, law enforcement need not obtain a warrant for searches 
conducted on items which a third-party has already searched, whether that party was entitled to 
perform the search or not.178  This doctrine currently facilitates the cooperation of private 
companies with government agencies in finding and identifying users of child pornography for the 
 
175 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
176 See, e.g., Supplemental Brief of Appellant-Petitioner at 20, Holyoak v. Gaos, 2018 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4654 
(2018) (in which the petitioner argues that the reasoning of Carpenter should be extended to protect Google search 
terms). 
177 Id. at 2218 (noting that when the government acquires CSLI on an individual, that individual “has effectively been 
tailed every moment of every day . . . and the police may . . . call upon the results of that surveillance without regard 
to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment.”).  
178 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
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purpose of combatting child abduction and exploitation.179  Technology companies are able to 
compare the digital signature of files in user’s accounts (a hash) to the signature for known child 
pornography media.180  This scan is run on a continual basis, and when the company finds an image 
that matches the description, it alerts the government to the existence of the file, and the identity 
of the owner of said file.181  Because the company has already abridged the user’s privacy by 
identifying the file, the government is not required to obtain a warrant to verify the contents of the 
file.182  In effect, the scanning required to identify these files constitutes twenty-four hour 
surveillance.  For all intents and purposes, the government is facilitating the invasion of privacy 
by a private party not bound by Fourth Amendment search requirements and is able to create a 
loop-hole by which it can constantly surveil the defendant’s files for contraband.  Given that the 
Supreme Court found a subpoena of information maintained and exploited by a third-party 
problematic in Carpenter, this may initiate the partial undermining of the private search doctrine 
as well.183  Can a company voluntarily surrender to the government non-content data on its users 
which would otherwise require the state to obtain a warrant?  
VI. The Shortcomings of Katz in the Context of Technological Advances 
The third-party doctrine has held at bay many issues arising from the application of Katz to 
new technological paradigms.  But, in carving out an exception, Carpenter generates uncertainty 
 
179 United States v. Stevenson, 3:12-cr-00005, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194725 (2012) (in this case, AOL reported child 
pornography images it detected to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which then reported it to 
local law enforcement). 
180 Id.  
181 Id. 
182 See, e.g., United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636, 638–40 (5th Cir. 2018). 
183 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).  If it is unconstitutional for the government to subpoena 
a third party for information that party has on an individual, it may be unconstitutional to have a system set up that 
amounts to continual government surveillance of emails or other online activities. 
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around application of the test to other novel surveillance questions and may thus inject more 
subjectivity in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
One problem in applying a test which relies on societal norms is that, by definition, there is no 
societal norms around the treatment of new technology.  Society has not yet established norms and 
expectations around new technologies, and courts will thus be left to guess what society might be 
prepared to accept in such cases.184  This essentially places judges in the role of policy-makers, 
and rather than determining what society’s expectations are, they will be enabled and even 
expected to announce what society’s expectations should be instead.185  Indeed, there are few 
guidelines in determining what society is prepared to accept as reasonable.  In Ciraolo, for 
example, the Court upheld aerial surveillance because, it reasoned that individuals have no 
expectation of privacy in what is visible to the naked eye, and further, are aware that aircraft are 
flying overhead.186  Thus, the knowledge that information is visible to others, and the general 
knowledge that surveillance is occurring could conceivably create a cycle of diminishing privacy 
expectations.  Already, society is aware of data breaches, hacks, corporate misuse and improper 
sharing of information, in addition to potentially improper government surveillance.187  Because 
society has thus been conditioned to expect and grown accustomed to a reduced expectation of 
privacy, should this mean that the Katz test allows technology advancements to rob Americans of 
 
184 See Selbst, supra note 84, at 659 (observing that society’s reasonable expectation of privacy is dependent on its 
knowledge about surveillace occurring); see also Levinson-Waldman, supra note 157, at 551–52; see generally 
Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173 (1979) 
(discussing the circularity of premising the reasonability of an individual’s expectation of privacy on societal norms) 
[hereinafter Posner, Uncertain Protection]. 
185 Kerr, supra note 85, at 808. 
186 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986). 
187 See, e.g., Taylor Armerding, The 17 Biggest Data Breaches of the 21st Century, CSOONLINE (Jan. 26, 2018, 3:44 
AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/data-breach/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-century.html. 
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privacy rights?  In Kyllo, the Court acknowledges the possibility of such a cycle, and technology’s 
erosion of privacy rights through the “reasonable expectation” prong of the Katz test.188  
The Katz test’s potential to create results that are “subjective and unreasonable”— which the 
Supreme Court acknowledges—might have been an acceptable trade-off if it achieved the goal of 
protecting the privacy that underlies the Fourth Amendment.189  But it is not completely certain 
whether the Katz approach provides greater or lesser protection than the text of the Fourth 
Amendment itself, and the trespass approach.  In the cases of aerial surveillance and the use of a 
pen register to capture phone numbers dialed from within a home, for example, application of the 
Katz test resulted in reduced privacy expectations, rather than more.190  Further, the circularity of 
the reasonable expectation of privacy, and the potential subjectivity of its application have led to 
criticism that the doctrine is a “black hole” that “has never been able to do the work required of 
it.”191  
Additionally, Katz, though formulated to deal with advanced technological capabilities and the 
challenges associated therewith, presents a more fundamental challenge, that of reconciling it with 
the text of the Fourth Amendment.  In his dissent from Katz, Justice White lamented the Court’s 
attempt to “keep the Constitution up to date,” warning that the “effort would make [the Supreme 
Court] a continuously functioning constitutional convention.”192  As noted earlier, though the 
language of the Katz test does not require a touchpoint to the text of the Fourth Amendment, courts 
have been conservative in their application, such that the use of the Katz test has not resulted in 
vastly different outcomes than would reliance on common law trespass doctrine.  Given that 
 
188 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001). 
189 Id. (quoting Posner, Uncertain Protection, supra note 184, at 188). 
190 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213–14 (allowing aerial surveillance of an individual’s home); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735, 742–44 (1979) (upholding the use of a pen register, despite the fact that the numbers dialed were dialed from 
within the home). 
191 Jeb Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 103 (2008). 
192 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373 (1967) (White, J., dissenting). 
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Carpenter has created a crack in the third-party doctrine, however, it is conceivable that courts 
could craft responses and tests for what constitute a search that would have no possible justification 
in the text or historical understanding of the Fourth Amendment. 
VII. Reconciling Carpenter with the Text of the Fourth Amendment 
Given the subjectivity of the Katz doctrine and the Court’s own admission in Kyllo of its 
problematic application, courts should adopt an interpretation of the Carpenter decision that is 
grounded in the text of the Fourth Amendment and common law trespass doctrine, and which 
minimizes subjectivity when defining what constitutes a search in novel technological scenarios.  
In so doing, courts should recognize that, while the Fourth Amendment protects a degree of 
privacy, the framers could not possibly have conceived of today’s technology.  Thus, it is not a 
foregone conclusion that individuals have a reasonable Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy 
in their data.  Rather than crafting new protections, and thus fulfilling Justice White’s fear of the 
court devolving into a constitutional convention of its own, courts should refrain from making 
policy decisions where the Constitution is silent.  
Accordingly, the Court should afford new protection only when a government action 
potentially violates the privacy or security of one’s person, house, papers, or effects.  When 
determining the contours of what qualifies for these designations, courts will be forced to grapple 
with tough questions, but this mitigates some of the concern of judicial abuse of power.  In the 
context of the IOT, smart devices, and even computers generally, some records may be easily 
analogized to the physical items originally protected by the Fourth Amendment.  For example, an 
individual’s computer files could easily be related back to the “papers” mentioned in the Fourth 
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Amendment.193  Indeed, the naming of files and folders in the computer context is an implicit 
acknowledgement that they are the functional equivalent of physical papers, and the Court already 
distinguishes between content and non-content data.194  As to devices, however, it is more difficult 
to draw a neat analog to the founding days, or even trespass principles.  Some have suggested the 
concept of categorizing smart devices as “effects,” and protecting their associated data through a 
theory of “digital curtilage.”195  Debating the wisdom of a given classification is beyond the scope 
of this article, however, the very existence of a textual hook provides greater certainty and 
mitigates concerns of judicial activism.  To disregard the enumeration of protected properties in 
the Fourth Amendment is to imply that they are gratuitous, and unnecessary to the Amendment.  
Courts may desire to protect the privacy that was perhaps the object of the Fourth Amendment, 
but they should avoid the temptation to disregard the letter of the law in their zeal to fulfill the 
spirit. 
It is possible that such an approach, though it may change the outcome in certain cases, may 
not even diminish privacy protections.  As previously noted, the current Katz test as applied is 
already a mixed-bag in terms of its effect on privacy rights.  While acknowledging that there will 
be some normative violations of individual privacy that are beyond the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protection, as defined in the text of the amendment, the Court should provide strong 
and liberal protection where an analog can be shown to the items enumerated in the constitution.196 
 
193 See generally Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L., 112 
(2011). 
194 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–43 (1979) (distinguishing between the content of the call and the information 
about the call, e.g. the number that was dialed). 
195 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 
809 (2016). 
196 See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 373 (White, J., dissenting) (opposing the majority’s departure from the text of the Fourth 
Amendment, Justice White evinces a willingness to go “as far as a liberal construction of the language [of the Fourth 
Amendment] takes me” in protecting the privacy of individuals). 
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In the case of Carpenter, evaluating the ruling in light of the protections outlined in the text of 
the Fourth Amendment would provide clarity to some of the concerns raised by the ruling and 
eliminate others. 
It is important to acknowledge that, when dealing with time-series data, as in Carpenter, law 
enforcement is actually performing surveillance, albeit retroactively.197  The records the 
government may attempt to acquire from a company have already been collected by that company.  
But, for Fourth Amendment search purposes, this data should be treated as if the government had 
collected it, because acquiring examining these records is the functional equivalent to performing 
the surveillance in real-time.198  The Court in Carpenter and in Knotts expressed reservations about 
the implications of twenty-four-hour surveillance, and, in the case of Carpenter, the use of data 
even when held by a third party.199  While the reasoning in Carpenter was couched in the language 
of privacy, the truth is, allowing the government to benefit from a private entity’s constant 
surveillance of an individual enables law enforcement to trespass in constitutionally protected 
areas with impunity.  In Kyllo, the Court emphasized the need to “assure preservation of that degree 
of privacy that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”200  This concern resulted in a 
prohibition on the warrantless acquisition of information about a house that previously could not 
be obtained without physical intrusion.201  By the same token, increased efficiency due to 
 
197 The Court in Carpenter, while not explicitly endorsing this proposition, analogized retroactive data collection to 
physical surveillance.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).  Further, it notes that society would 
not expect that police officers could or would physically perform the surveillance yielding the equivalent volume and 
type on information which historical CSLI provides. Id. at 2217–18. 
198 This is not to imply that an agency relationship exists, but merely a realization of the reality that when law 
enforcement obtains this information, it is as if they were performing the surveillance themselves. 
199 The fact that CSLI is held by a third party was ultimately irrelevant to the outcome of Carpenter, as the Court 
found that the nature and quantity of this data placed it beyond the scope of the third-party doctrine.  Carpenter, 138 
S. Ct. at 2216–17. 
200 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
201 Id. 
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technology advances in the field of surveillance does not, in itself, pose a constitutional 
conundrum.202  This is especially the case when law enforcement could have obtained the same 
information through constitutionally permissible means in the absence of the technology.203  The 
common thread is that technology, while enhancing law enforcement capabilities, cannot provide 
access to what would have required a trespass.  While there was no concept of the comprehensive 
historical time-series data in the founding era, utilizing this information is the functional equivalent 
of performing surveillance, and the limits that would apply to physical surveillance should apply 
equally in this context, irrespective of the involvement of a third party. 
If information is not simply fair game because it is held by a third party, courts need not address 
whether an individual actively shared information or not.  Indeed, it is difficult to determine 
whether an individual has shared something with a third-party, as demonstrated in Carpenter.  The 
conclusion that location sharing is involuntary because avoiding it would require turning off the 
phone, disconnecting it from the network, or not carrying it constantly is troubling because it 
premises the outcome of the case on the implied lack of agency when it comes to phone 
discipline.204  It is well-known that cell phones track a user’s location.  Therefore, by carrying a 
cell phone and not taking precautions against this tracking, individuals assume the risk of 
broadcasting their location.  But, if the relevant enquiry is not solely whether the information about 
the user is shared with a third party, but instead, whether lawful police surveillance would have 
been able to achieve the same result, the problem of voluntary versus involuntary sharing drops 
out of the equation.  There are too many devices, broadcasting too much information, for too many 
 
202 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983). 
203 Id. 
204 When discussing the relationship between an individual and his phone, the Carpenter Court did not focus on the 
individual effort required to avoid such tracking, but simply noted the fact that people carry their phones 
“compulsively” such that the phone has almost become a “feature of human anatomy.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.  
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purposes, with too many metrics to make determinations for each whether active sharing has 
occurred.205  Indeed, the way individuals interact with their technology is continuing to change at 
a rapid pace and creating a coherent rule regarding a user’s expectation for each technology would 
be an exercise providing little clarity, and one that would likely be repeated frequently as new 
technologies emerge.  Instead, the Court should distinguish between affirmative acts by the user, 
and autonomous recording by the device.  Where an individual consciously shares something with 
a third party, less privacy should be afforded, consistent with Miller.206  At the same time, where 
a device can be co-opted to perform surveillance retro-actively, the data associated with that device 
should be subject to the same limitations that would be applicable if the government were 
performing physical surveillance.  This solution would both protect the privacy of the house 
against technological erosion of Fourth Amendment protections and provide greater clarity as to 
when the information could be used. 
In Carpenter as in Knotts, the Court expresses discomfort regarding the possibility of 24-hour 
surveillance.207  While holding that the facts in Carpenter required a warrant, however, the Court 
did not announce a rule that could be applied consistently.208  Instead, the Court noted the sensitive 
information about the “privacies of life” location data would expose.209  But, this concern is present 
whether surveillance occurs for one or 20 days, the difference is simply a matter of degree.  Knotts, 
 
205 There are over seven billion IOT devices, and over seventeen billion devices connected to the internet as a whole, 
including smart phones, tablets, etc.  Knud Lasse Lueth, State of the IoT 2018: Number of IoT Devices now at 7B—
Market Accelerating, IOT ANALYTICS (Aug. 8, 2018), https://iot-analytics.com/state-of-the-iot-update-q1-q2-2018-
number-of-iot-devices-now-7b/. 
206 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“when a person communicates information to a third party even 
on the understanding that the communication is confidential, he cannot object if the third party conveys that 
information . . . to law enforcement.”). 
207 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216–17 (2018). 
208 “Our decision today is a narrow one.  We do not express a view on matters not before us . . . or call into question 
conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras.  Nor do we address other business records 
that might incidentally reveal location information.”  Id. at 2220. 
209 Id. at 2217. 
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while not ruling directly on the topic, framed the problem as one of moving between public and 
private spheres, and thus while the method of surveillance may be warranted, the constitutionality 
may turn on the time and location during which surveillance is taking place.210  
When requesting time-series data from a past time period one would necessarily be ignorant 
as to its contents until examining it.  Thus, it is possible, for example, that for records requested in 
a given time period, the data would include information that is collected from within the surveilled 
party’s home, giving rise to Fourth Amendment concerns.211  This fact, however, should not 
preclude the gathering of any data whatsoever.  Instead, Carpenter could be applied to preclude 
government from subpoenaing time-series records (location or otherwise) that would almost 
certainly contain information protected by the Fourth Amendment due to its likelihood to reveal 
something about the home.  This would entail limiting subpoenaed documents to periods of time 
that are not certain to include time where the defendant would be at his house, for example.  When 
requesting documents, the government would be limited to time ranges beneath twenty-four hours, 
as an individual is almost certain to be at his house at some point within that interval.  Even if not 
at his own house, he would be somewhere that would still qualify as a “house” be it a hotel room 
a guest room in another’s house, or another temporary residence.212  This would not necessarily 
burden law enforcement unduly.  In Carpenter, for example, the government was attempting to 
link Carpenter to known crimes.213  Thus, in reality, there were certain time ranges in which the 
government was truly interested that would have provided the evidence of his proximity to the 
 
210 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284. 
211 Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012).  The District Court ordered the suppression of any GPS data 
obtained while the vehicle was parked at the defendant’s home.  In so doing, the Court recognized the Fourth 
Amendment implications of multi-day monitoring, and the need to protect the privacy of the home. 
212 Kerr, supra note 85, at 819. 
213 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018) (the police were investigating a series of robberies at nine 
different stores). 
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crimes.214  Much of the information obtained by the government was gratuitous, and there was not 
necessarily a basis for suspecting the defendant of nefarious activity in that time.215  A subpoena 
requesting the time ranges corresponding to the known crimes would have served the 
government’s purpose, respected privacy rights, and would have been consistent with the holding 
in Carpenter.  
Applying a likelihood of trespass approach to subpoenaed time-series data would not only limit 
the government from obtaining broad swathes of time, for which a small percentage is actually 
relevant to the crime under investigation, it would also provide further protection to individuals 
with respect to, for example, the time of day for which records could be requested.  If there is no 
reason to believe an individual is out of his home at 1:00 am, then subpoenaing information for 
that time would amount to a trespass, as it is more likely than not that an individual would be 
home.  The suspicion, however, that an individual committed nefarious acts at that time, supported 
by any evidence would reduce the likelihood that particular individual would have been in their 
home at that time, and would provide justification for the subpoena.  This approach would provide 
clarity in the application of Carpenter, provide a textual basis for judicial holdings, and enhance 
Fourth Amendment protections for individuals while still affording law enforcement the ability to 
perform needed investigative work without the burden of obtaining a warrant. 
VIII. Alternatives to New Judicial Standards 
This Comment does not seek to take a position on the desirability or detriment of increased 
protections for privacy given the ever-changing technological landscape.  What it does argue, 
however, is that threats to individual privacy and the need for protection does not justify the 
 
214  The police matched the CSLI to the locations and times of the robberies, which were already known.  Id. at 2213.  
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invocation of the Fourth Amendment in cases where doing so requires a departure from the text 
itself.  Ultimately, even given the contention of some that the Constitution and its provisions were 
designed to have enough flexibility to handle novel situations, it must be admitted that the drafters 
of the Fourth Amendment could not possibly have imagined the challenges attendant to technology 
today.216  Resorting to their underlying intentions, then, is a futile exercise because there are many 
scenarios faced today which bear no resemblance, and cannot be analogized to the specific 
problems the Founders sought to address with the Fourth Amendment.217  That is not to say that 
all technology is beyond the scope of Fourth Amendment protection.  But it does mean that we 
should acknowledge the possibility that there are some things that may not be rationalized to the 
text of the amendment, and threats to privacy notwithstanding, the Amendment should not be 
adjusted to cover such gaps. 
One of the ironies of a judicial standard which requires a court to ascertain what society at 
large finds reasonable is that judges are uniquely ill-equipped to grapple with this question.  The 
Supreme Court has even conceded to the criticism of Katz’s application as being “circular, and 
hence subjective and unpredictable.”218  In cases that involve items mentioned in the text of the 
Fourth Amendment, the application is straightforward: society presumptively accepts an 
expectation of privacy in those things to which the Constitution explicitly grants protection.219  In 
 
216 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373 (1967) (White, J., dissenting) (“Since I see no way in which the 
words of the Fourth Amendment can be [applied,] . . . that closes the matter for me. . . .  I willingly go as far as a 
liberal construction of the language takes me, but I simply cannot in good conscience give a meaning to words which 
they have never before been thought to have and which they certainly do not have in common ordinary usage.”).  But 
see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472–74 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (speaking of the application of 
constitutional provisions to new and unforeseen circumstances, Brandeis writes, “[t]he future is their care and 
provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made.”).   
217 One such example is Google search terms.  See, e.g., supra note 176. 
218 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
219 See id. (acknowledging the difficulties of determining what society deems reasonable, but that for a prototypical 
area of protection, such as the home, which has deep common law protections and has been heavily litigated, the 
answer is evident). 
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Carpenter, however, the Court looked to historic law enforcement capabilities and reasoned that, 
because surveillance yielding the type of information at issue would have been costly and 
practically impossible prior to the digital age, society recognizes an expectation of privacy against 
it as reasonable today.220  It is true, however, that society’s tolerance changes over time, and thus, 
it is unclear why the Court chose to reference pre-digital age society in that case to determine 
reasonableness.  Because this is a subjective test, the sword cuts both ways.  Indeed, were that 
logic applied to Ciraolo, the Court would perhaps have found the defendant’s expectation of 
privacy against aerial surveillance reasonable.  After all, before flight became common-place, this 
would not have been possible.221  Though society’s expectations may change, these decisions have 
precedential effect, and thus become evidence of what society would find reasonable. 
As it happens, there is a mechanism through which society may express its views on what 
constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy: the legislative process.  Where the Constitution 
does not mandate a warrant, Congress and the states may nonetheless add however much 
protection they deem necessary to sufficiently protect the privacy of their respective citizens.  In 
fact, there are many examples of Congress doing just that.  The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act—while not going so far as to mandate a warrant when the government seek to 
obtain medical information from a provider—does require that provider to notify the patient before 
the records are disclosed, giving them the opportunity to object in court.222  The Stored 
Communications Act provides several protections for data that is stored by a third party, even 
requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant before it may request certain information.223 
 
220 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
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Even where the Court has not found a violation of the Fourth Amendment, Congress has, at 
times, stepped in to impose privacy requirements.  In fact, the Right to Financial Privacy Act was 
passed in response to Miller, prohibiting the government conduct which the Court held not to be 
violative of the Fourth Amendment.224  Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) now prohibits law 
enforcement from installing a pen register without a Court order, another activity which the Court 
found to be compatible with Fourth Amendment protections.225  
These examples show that Congress is both willing and able to act in order to protect privacy, 
and that it is not necessary for the Supreme Court to go beyond the text of the Fourth Amendment 
to achieve the same result.  Indeed, Congress is better suited to handle such questions as it is more 
representative than the courts, and is vested with considerable fact-finding capabilities, allowing 
it to better tailor solutions.226  When the Court acts to expand the Fourth Amendment, it short 
circuits the process, robbing society of the benefit of a needed robust debate on the issue.  Rather 
than attempting to fix an issue, or guarantee privacy not explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution, 
the Court, in strictly interpreting textual provisions should allow inconsistencies and inadequacies 
in the law to manifest themselves, allowing the legislators to address these in a manner that accords 
with the will of the people.   
IX. Conclusion 
The Katz test, with its focus on privacy, may seem to provide flexibility for Fourth Amendment 
protections in the context of a digital world, but in reality, it has not produced a great shift in 
 
224 SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745 (1984) (stating explicitly that the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 
12 U.S.C. § 3401, was passed in response to the Court’s ruling in Miller). 
225 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a).  The Court upheld the use of a pen register under the third-party doctrine.  Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979). 
226 Richard J. Pierce Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973 (1996) (stating 
that legislatures and agencies “are far better than courts at performing the difficult empirical work required to estimate 
the costs and benefits of alternative decisionmaking procedures.”). 
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outcomes.  Similarly, though the Carpenter decision departs from the third-party doctrine, 
announcing a right of privacy in the whole of one’s physical movements, the case need not be 
disruptive of the Fourth Amendment status quo.  As technology continues to advance, however, it 
becomes clearer that the Fourth Amendment may not continue to stretch and provide protection to 
privacy generally without completely detaching it from the literal text. 
Courts should see in Carpenter an opportunity to take a more text-based approach and return 
to property concepts on which the Fourth Amendment was based.  Indeed, there is no need for 
courts to assume the role of guardians of privacy as that is both the province of Congress, and 
something they have shown themselves capable of addressing.  
